15 Dec 2010

Poem: A Dream of Freedom

A dream of freedom
A mountain over our heads
The bitter morass, the child doth wail
It looms, the mountain
It looms

Curiously it’s still
Just hanging, right there
Above it’s still, just falling, right there
And the shadow it casts
Just black

The false prophet, he cries:
“The mountain its yours.
There’s nothing beyond, only rock
One place for you, accept it”
Your lot

A shout once stifled
Into many whispers, much louder
Receptive to words, words of the ancestors
A light remembered, the light…
It beckons

Cracks in rock, though small
Through perseverance and dynamite
Widen and widen, minds narrow and narrow
Only one goal, no matter how
AVALANCHE

With structure now
gone and boundaries now
gone, And light it
seeps in; and happiness, it wells up; and joy, it overfl
ows. The prophet, yes, he wails: “Will it! Do it!”
Take your chance, he urges...

And the media urge: use, destroy with it; bathe, run in it; focus, diffuse it; harness, flow with it; whisper, shout about it…
And the people shout: FLY
For the people heard what they want;
and with structure now gone, and boundaries now gone
they did what they want

The sun, it doth burn
The fair skin into charred.
Some heavenward fly, greedy hands grab
Power from flight weary, gasping,
On ground


New masters, same work
Face our toil, without shade
The people cry, oh why, can’t we just
Have a mountain that’s over
Our head?

Annals of history are such
Yet hope, of freedom, still remains
Where shade, not from a mountain extends
But from a ‘canopy of peace’
Amen.

8 Dec 2010

Confronted Man - Tragic Philosophy: Part 1

I fear that philosophy- taken to its proper conclusions- is a necessarily tragic ethic that rightly belongs with the rest of Greek culture.  It starts with the individual self who doubts and questions; and ends, at best, with knowledge and facts.  If a man confronts the world as something-to-be-known, he is making it into something of an entirely different order than himself:  The subjective will of man over and against the objective and lifeless order of the world.

As R’ Soloveitchik says:

Even the most abandoned voluptuary becomes disillusioned like the king of Ecclesiastes and finds himself encountering something wholly other than his own self, an outside that defies and challenges him…  He discovers an awesome and mysterious domain of things and events which is independent of and disobedient to him

Why should we be disillusioned?  Surely, man can end up as much with victory, as defeat.  He can end up conquering the world with his superior intellect and knowing everything there is to be known.  Quite so, but as Wittgenstein states, “We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered [and thus know all true facts about the world], the problems of life remain completely untouched.  Of course there are no questions left…” 

What the person really wants to find is precisely what he can’t; there are no more questions to ask and reality has no more to yield.  In fact, it is precisely this cognition that brings into sharp relief our inability to find meaning in the world: “The facts all contribute to setting the problem, not to its solution” (Wittgenstein).  The absurdity of existence lies in us witnessing fact after random fact without being able to give answer to the question of “Why?”  Facts are clearly stated but it is the lack of a language- our lack of grip- on questions of meaning that lead us to the philosophical conundrum that Albert Camus once pondered.

There is but one truly serious philosophical problem, and that is suicide. Judging whether life is or is not worth living amounts to answering the fundamental question of philosophy

This then is philosophy; by standing external to all events and things as the impartial judge, you will only ever become acquainted with things (like scientific facts) that can be known externally and impartially.  You will never be able to reach out to that which is beyond your intellectual grasp.  You will never become acquainted with the interiority of the other.  The intimate- knowing- relationship with the world, other people and G-d that fill life with meaning will be missing.

This can be seen most forcefully with Maimonides whose highest goal was to know G-d and yet where this was the one thing (necessarily, according to his philosophy) that completely evaded him.  To know something was for it to be demonstratively true; where impartial logic would demand it be so.  Here, Aristotle was King knowing every true statement under the sun.  What Aristotle missed, however, was that you can know all this and it not bear on the most important problem of life.  To declare anything in the world as G-d would be to cheapen the concept and yet, that is all we can know in a demonstrative fashion.  Moses, according to Maimonides, achieved his perfection by knowing the whole world and knowing that it was not G-d.  Thus, the highest level of man consists of being aware that there is nothing he can know of G-d, nothing he can say about Him and continually being reminded of the distance between them. 

This realisation could lead to breakdown:

Man may despair, succumb to the overpowering pressure of the objective outside and end in mute resignation, failing to discharge his duty as an intellectual being, and thus dissolving an intelligent existence into an absurd nightmare. (Soloveitchik)

Yet, the alternative route of carrying out your intellectual duty is, as we have seen, no less tragic.  One is left, as Wittgenstein points out, at a place where solipsism, idealism and realism meet.  Solipsism, because “The world is my world” where yours is the only subjective self that you meet.  Idealism, because only what is possible to be ‘thought’ can be the case, and G-d and ethics are outside that.  Realism, because “The world is all that is the case” independent of my will.  Here the philosopher left with a lonely, detached individual facing a cold, hard, objective world.

Maimonides, Soloveitchik and Wittgenstein all bide us to fulfil our duty as intellectual beings and advance in the scientific world.  Yet, solving these problems “shows how little is achieved when these problems are solved”.  How can a philosophical ethic be achieved on this basis?  How can we go on without knowing the interiority of the other?  Why not just commit suicide?

30 Nov 2010

Help, that isn’t

Trying to help people isn’t all it’s cracked up to be!

I spend half my life holding the door open for people.  After all, isn’t that the polite, even gentlemanly, thing to do?  Yet unless you judge it just right, it ends up being more of an inconvenience than a help.  If they are just that bit too far away, then there are only two possible options.  Either they start quick-stepping to the door so that they can get through without making you wait. Or, they walk at the pace they would have done anyway and you end up standing there like a lemon.  The former is making them unnecessarily rush and expecting them to show gratitude for it!  The latter means that you both end up feeling uncomfortable with the situation and yet, unable to change what you are doing.

Another example is on the London Underground where the ‘right’ thing to do is to give up your seat to the elderly or those less able to stand.  You see someone on a busy, rush-hour train out of the corner of their eye and a surge of compassion comes over you.  You gesture for them to take your place, whilst you are prepared to stand in the sweaty abyss.  What a knight in shining armour! What princely valour!  Except, of course, when the corner of your eye misjudges someone’s age.  If you actually ask a middle-aged woman to sit, you are basically saying that they look elderly and worthy of special treatment, despite the multitude of middle-aged women there!  They laugh or give a half-smile, feeling acutely embarrassed that they were asked and say “no, you’re alright”; and you sit there embarrassed watching the floor so you don’t feel compelled to be nice again.

There are just so many examples.  I’m certainly careful before trying to be a peacemaker, when often the two people would rather have a good spat and don’t want my patronising nonsense.  What’s the moral of the story?  I don’t know.

20 Nov 2010

Facetious Insignificance

A large part of what I like about halacha and Judaism is that things matter and nothing is to be treated lightly.  Our actions and deeds, the world and all its objects have meaning for us.  This is not necessarily to say that there is meaning out there to be discovered, as maybe we construct much of it for ourselves.  It is, however, a statement that everything should evoke a rational, ethical and emotional response from human beings.  More than anything, it a moral imperative to be serious and engaged with the world in such a way that befits our human dignity.

Any serious response involves making distinctions, putting things into categories and deciding priorities.  In the Jewish setting, this is embodied in commandments and custom but the ethical dimension may well evoke a less formal response in other cultures.  It is no less true than in any academic discipline where information is sorted, categorised and interpreted.  

Yet, too many people leave their rationality at the laboratory door, at work or in the academy, and take a ‘live and let live’ attitude to their lives outside.   It is the scientific categories and distinctions, for example, that really matter and everything else is plain vanilla by comparison.  And just like its corresponding ice cream flavour- why make a fuss about it?  With a twinkle in the eye and a shrug of the shoulder, any life-affecting obligation can be shook off:

‘Who cares what lifestyle I choose so long as I don’t harm anyone?  Morality is culturally relative and people can live as they please.  Why distinguish or categorise people or actions as that just excludes!’ 

This is not to say that no argument exists for relativism, libertarianism or excluding regulation from certain areas of your life.  It’s the way some people say with a look that tells you that it doesn’t matter a darn bit how you answer them.  The people for whom rationality is pointless because any distinction just doesn’t matter- to them.  Care-free people for whom any action is equal and every distinction irrelevant if it simply doesn’t bother them! 

This attitude in extremis- a failure to draw distinctions or let them impinge on you in any way- is a denial of one’s humanity.  It reminds me of a case in Oliver Sack’s The Man Who Mistook his Wife for a Hat about a patient who had a brain tumour and underwent a personality change, becoming complete superficial and uncaring:

Testing left-right discrimination was oddly difficult , because she said left or right indifferently…

‘Left/right. Right/left.  Why the fuss? What’s the difference?’

‘Is there a difference?’ I asked

‘Of course,’ she said, with a chemists precision.  ‘You could call the enanitiomorphs of each other.  But they mean nothing to me.  They’re no different for me.  Hands… Doctors… Sisters…’ she added, seeing my puzzlement.  ‘Don’t you understand?  They mean nothing – nothing to me.  Nothing means anything… at least to me.’

‘And this meaning nothing…’ I hesitated, afraid to go on.  ‘This meaningless… does this bother you?  Does this mean anything to you?’

‘Nothing at all,’ she said promptly, with a bright smile, in the tone of one who makes a joke, wins an argument, wins at poker…. Nothing any longer felt “real” (or “unreal”).  Everything was now “equivalent” or “equal”- the whole world reduced to a facetious insignificance

I’m not saying that those who don’t agree with examining the small things in life has a neurological disease but perhaps they are not fulfilling their true potentiality as a rational being.  Of course, what I like about Judaism may be what another hates.  This is what someone said was the best thing about leaving the religious-Jewish fold (http://daashedyot.blogspot.com/2010/08/better-know-kofer-sam.html):

The best thing... hmmm... maybe that you don't have to take everything so seriously. Every choice and action isn't considered such a major issue that you always need to be absolutely confident is the exact right thing to do

Now, whilst I certainly don’t believe in being confident that my actions are the exact right thing to do (in fact, I think halacha is about doing things even without that certainty), I certainly think my actions should be considered.  Whilst prohibitions or commands may be highly annoying, I’m not one for a care-free disposition and no-one can accuse me of treating things with a facetious insignificance.

19 Nov 2010

Pro-Israel, Pro-Freedom of Speech

Dear UJIA,

I would just like to pass on my support and encouragement to UJIA Chairman Mick Davis, after the so-called 'shockwaves' that have been sent through the Jewish community.

I have both donated to and benefited from UJIA-funded activities and am now encouraged to do more so in future. 

As a Zionist, I support your activities.  As an advocate of Israel, I realise the potential for public criticism being mis-used and the need to be careful.  But as a critical human being, I am pleased to hear people speak their mind.

One may agree or disagree with particular views expressed.  However, it is absolutely right that the oft-used phrase "just because we support Israel, doesn't mean we support all government policies" isn't merely theoretical or vacuous.  And certainly the view of another Jewish leader that "diaspora Jews should never criticise Israel" is absurd and immoral.

As with everything else in life, Zionists have a plurality of opinions.  It is good for Mick to express his.  I'm glad UJIA is showing itself as a "big tent" for all Zionists

Shabbat Shalom.

Neil Clarke

18 Nov 2010

A Toast to Cashing-In

In honour of iTunes now being able to makes lots of money off The Beatles, I thought I would offer an un-reasoned, but absolutely correct opinion as to their best album.  And the winner is….

Rubber Soul

It may not have the stand-out songs of Let It Be, and it may not have the musical influence of Sergeant Peppers or The White Album, but it is the best taken as an album in totality.   There isn’t a duff/embarrassing song on there and most stand the test of time. You can just sit back and listen to this fast-paced album right from beginning to end. The band seems completely at ease with their song-writing with all original songs and no pseudo-spirituality-  just a band doing what it does best.    

And that’s the final word.

28 Oct 2010

Do non-Jewish actions count for anything?

Sometimes Facebook status messages and subsequent comments deserve more attention, and greater longevity, than they would get if hidden away on someone’s ‘Wall’ beneath hundreds of other messages.  This is one such status message.  Someone who has “Unofficial Jewish tendencies” and greatly attracted to Chassidut and Kabbalah became disheartened on hearing their views of non-Jews.  I believe the discussion bears on important issues. 

Please note: I have edited the discussion, changing names apart from my own and taken out the numerous personal comments.  It is not about the person involved but the issues involved.

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Jane Jackson learnt today that my deeds "do not add or subtract from the state of creation, nor do they cause Gd to reveal itself or withdraw. All they can do is bring about their own gain or loss..." and is feeling more than a little disheartened.

Neil Clarke On the other hand, Rambam says "With a single good deed he will tip the scales for himself, and for the entire world, to the side of good."

Jim Bowen Bye, bye Chassidus

Jane Jackson Is Rambam referring to Jews perchance?

Jim Bowen This week Ramban calls Rambam a heretic. Judaism can descend into racism pretty quickly when you make an ontological commitment to certain chassidic ideas.

Jane Jackson Are you saying from a NON chassidic viewpoint that my deeds do effect a change in the spiritual realm? Or that there is no connecton between physical deeds and changes in the spiritual realm at all? Hmmm?

Neil Clarke As to your earlier question, Rambam does say "all men", as opposed to "all Israel" when talking about our customs during ten days of repentance. Plus, Rambam never makes an absolute distinction between Jews and Gentiles. We will find it easier because of the Torah but everyone has the same potential. He believes non-Jews have the same capacity for prophecy.

Neil Clarke As to your question about "spiritual realms" a non-kabbalist (let us leave chassidim out of it, because you can have non-chassidic kabbalists) wouldn't talk about 'spiritual realms' in the same way. But they would definitely say our actions have an effect in a) this world b) our soul c) G-d's accounting of us. Rav Hirsch, for example, thinks it makes mitzvot 'amulets' if you want them to effect (what he calls) 'dream worlds'. The Torah allows us to make spirituality a living reality

Jane Jackson So are you saying (or Rambam saying...) that non-Jews have a neshama with the same potential as a Jewish neshama in terms of spiritual growth and attainment (ie. in olam haba)? And would a non-kabblist say that a non-Jew's actions have the same effects in this world/our souls/Gd's accounting of us? Or lesser?

Jim Bowen Bilam is the key Torah example of a non-Jewish capacity for prophecy. Regarding your last question, the latter option is the more likely, owing to a fundamental disagreement in the nature of the spiritual realm. To clarify, I thought your... original quote was non-chassidic, referring to everyone. Neil, I refer to chassidus because it incorporates the kind of ideology which I'm assuming Jane is being exposed to here; I could be wrong. A non-chassidic kabbalist worth looking at if you want another take would be Rav Yitzchak Kook; I don't know if he would say something similar to what you've heard here, but somehow I suspect not. Where did this come from? A more level playing field is created by dispelling the notion of the divine spark within a Jew (something inherently present) and considering instead the divine potential of a human to become like Gd through their actions (which emulation we would say is possible through study of the Torah as an instruction manual to guide decisions).

Jane Jackson Non Jews do not have a divine spark then? I was reading Derech Hashem....

Jim Bowen I've always had a problem with the racist undertones when I've been told that non-Jews are fundamentally different and in some way 'spiritually' inferior to Jews. Don't have the sources to counter it to my satisfaction though I'm afraid; maybe Neil does. :)

Jim Bowen The question is not whether non-Jews have a divine spark, but whether such a thing as a piece of Gd exists in people at all. Rather, do we not all have potential to fulfil Gd's will? The non-Jew has fewer obligations, making it easier I suppose, but the more mitzvot required of a person the more difficult it is to do what Gd wants of you, thus the more praiseworthy it is to do it. I think. Does that make sense?

Neil Clarke I can't speak on behalf of all non-kabbalists! For Rambam, yes- a non-Jew has the same potential. Only Jews have a "divine nation" where all these things are written into our everyday laws and lives, and so we will be more likely to be successful. But 'the righteous of all nations have a place in Olam Haba'

Plus, 'neshama' may be a slightly different concept for non-Kabbalists. Kabbalists have it that a neshama is literally part of G-d. Adam Kadmon was an entirely spiritual being, and when he sinned the 'vessels shattered' into millions of pieces and got caught in the sitra achra- our bodies. 'Knesset Yisrael' is the totality of all these divine sparks trapped inside a Jew's body. Therefore: Jews souls = Knesset Yisrael = Adam Kadmon = Shechina.

In this picture, a non-Jew only has an animal soul because, whilst he can be as good as a Jew, he doesn't have part of that original divine spark.

A non-kabbalist wouldn't take that view of a neshama. The neshama is our purpose, that which animates our body and gives it 'the breath of life'. Non-Jews can elevate the physical as much as anyone else, as they also have a divine purpose. For a kabbalist, the physical is the sitra achra- "the dark side". For a non-kabbalist, the physical is neutral: we can either live an unredeemed animal existence, or use the physical in a spiritual G-d given way.See More

Neil Clarke Although, Jim in bringing up Rav Kook- yes, he was clearly a kabbalist. And he definately believed in "divine sparks".
He does write that he saw a Rembrandt painting, and thought that when the vessels shattered, he gave some of that light to Rembrandt to put in his paintings.

Also: Through dispersion among gentiles, [Judaism] gathers and incorporates the fragments of truth wherever it finds them scattered- Rabbi Elijah Benamozegh (1823-1900)

Neil Clarke Also, as for Bilaam the Sifrei says:

"There has arisen no prophet in Israel like unto Moses" but in the Gentile world there has arisen[such a prophet]. And who? Balaam the son of Beor

So, he had the potential, but he blew it!

Jim Bowen See Derech Hashem as a good representation of a kabbalistic world view, but not the be all and end all of orthodox Jewish thought; it's one version of Judaism, but is not the whole. Ramchal's writing is rooted in a kabbalistic and chassidic tradition which you are under no obligation to adopt or accept.

Jane Jackson Yes, that goes make sense, non-kabbalists see it as though there isn't necessarily a divine spark in Jews or anyone... and that anyone - Jew or non-Jew - has the potential to realise Gd and elevate the physical and use it for it's spiritual purpose? But it's harder for a Jew as they have more 'rules'. Ok. I like kabblistic thought but at this time... it's quite hard for me to feel so pointless...

Neil Clarke I just want to end on a positive- sometimes when one spends their time arguing against something, they end up sounding negative...

As such, I certainly do believe in a 'divine spark' within us. It is t...hat spiritual element G-d has given us (whatever that might be) which allows us to be more than just an animal, and allows us- through our actions- to resemble the divine.

As it says in Tanach, in the Book of Kings/Melachim:

"I call heaven and earth to witness, BE A MAN A JEW OR A NON-JEW, man or woman, manservant or maidservant, only according to their actions will the spirit of G-d rest upon them"

12 Oct 2010

Working Life…

Working life certainly takes some getting used to!

The earliest I’ll finish work is 5.30- and only because I have just started the job.  This is followed by an hour and a quarter squashed commute back on the underground.  Then, after I have done a few sits up and had a shower, gobbled down some delicious pasta topped with ketchup in 5 minutes flat and gone to synagogue for evening prayers, it is already 8 in the evening! 

I then, depressingly, only have two hours to myself to do somethingOne thing.  I have the choice of watching Star Trek or doing some reading or see a friend for an hour or playing an instrument or writing something interesting or do some learning.  But only if I’m decisive.  If I just mill around for a bit- say, half an hour- I find its already getting too late to do anything.  The instrument will disturb the neighbours, it will be pointless seeing the friend for such a short time, I’ll be too tired to learn and I’ll miss the beginning of Star Trek. 

Of course, if I am sociable and go straight out for a few pints after work with my colleagues, then it is literally back to bed slightly woozy without even doing any exercise, going to synagogue or having a shower.

Today I wrote this. Better luck tomorrow.

Delivering Value

“Adding Value” is one of those potentially vacuous pieces of business talk that one has to grow accustomed to.  We need to focus- so the jargon goes- on the “Value Zone” and deliver our resources there.  My development goals will be around how I can “deliver value” for the company.  The steps from procurement through to sales is a “physical value chain” which can be modelled by a “virtual value chain”

Of course, there is nothing wrong with the idea, as such.  It’s just about the competitive edge that comes from adding something that will deliver great benefits for little costs.  It is the extra feature that makes something greater than the sum of its parts.  Basically, add a lick of paint to the walls of your house and you’ll get a much better price for it!

However, when I see a Royal Mail van with “Delivering Value” emblazoned on its side, I tend to think that it would be much better if they could just “Value Delivery” instead!

2 Sept 2010

10 Books to Buy….

…if I had the money and time.

1. My Journey- Tony Blair

2. Heavenly Torah: As Refracted Through the Generations- Abraham Joshua Heschel

3. Jerusalem: Or on Religious Power and Judaism by Moses Mendelssohn

4. On Certainty-  Ludwig Wittgenstein

5.  The Complete Novels of Kafka- Franz Kafka

6. Essays (Penguin Modern Classics) - George Orwell

7. A New History of Western Philosophy by Anthony Kenny

8. Why Evolution is True by Jerry A. Coyne

9. The Sunflower: On the Possibilities and Limits of Forgiveness by Simon Wiesenthal

10. Awakenings by Oliver Sacks

31 Aug 2010

Who Reads the Papers?

Once true, always true.

Jim Hacker: "Don't tell me about the press. I know exactly who reads the papers:
- The Daily Mirror is read by people who think they run the country;
- The Guardian is read by people who think they ought to run the country;
- The Times is read by people who actually do run the country;
- The Daily Mail is read by the wives of the people who run the country;
- The Financial Times is read by people who own the country;
- The Morning Star is read by people who think the country ought to be run by another country;
- And the Daily Telegraph is read by people who think it is."

Sir Humphrey: "Prime Minister, what about the people who read the Sun?"

Bernard Woolley: "Sun readers don't care who runs the country, as long as she's got big tits."

27 Aug 2010

Over 1500 Days Without a Visit

This Saturday is Gilad Shalit's 24th birthday, has been in captivity for four years and has been living without basic humanitarian rights.  The Red Cross, who are meant to ensure such rights, have yet to visit him.  Here is a letter that a cousin of mine who works for the Jewish Agency in Israel has written.  She suggests that it can be adjusted to your personal feelings and send it to one of the addresses at the bottom.

---

I cannot express too strongly my disappointment at the clearly feeble and half-hearted attempts made by the ICRC to visit Gilad Shalit.

To claim on your web-site that you are still “working just as hard” to visit Gilad when you first failed 4 years ago only means that you have not increased the pressure nor have you shown- for years- any creative initiative.  For one small soldier the effort is apparently not worthwhile.

You have clearly never countered Hamas’ refusals by trying to “upgrade” your own efforts but have just carried on as before, knowing that you will continue to fail. When asked “What exactly have you asked Hamas to do?” you simply ignore your own interviewer’s question and give no real detail whatsoever, just the same old generalisations and platitutdes.  The conclusion must be that there is no detail to give.

To admit on your website that “there is only so much that we can do for them” is a total abandonment of your creed.  You no longer have true belief in your mission, and your double duties as messenger to one Israeli soldier and as protector of the poor and hungry in Gaza have led you into the worst ways of expediency, well on the road that leads to total defeat.  You have lost your own self-esteem and, I am convinced of it, that of many thousands of others.

It took you four years of failure before you even realised that “working behind the scenes” is a pointless, hopeless way of dealing with Hamas.  FOUR YEARS!!  Against this background, you could never persuade any reasonable man that you have been really trying at all.

Please think of these things…

----

Suggested addresses:

For Near & Middle East:  dkrimitsas@icrc.org (Dorothea Krimitsas- Media Relations Officer)

Jerusalem: jerusalem.jer@icrc.org (Ms. Barbara Amstad)

International Office: Review@gva@icrc.org

26 Aug 2010

Scary Thought

A soldier cannot absolve himself of an immoral act because he was only following orders. Equally, bystanders bear some responsibility if they know some evil is going on and yet do not protest. After all, “all it takes for evil to prevail, is for good men to do nothing”. Yet, would I be one such bystander? How can I even declare a mild confidence as to what I would do?

Most people would like to flatter themselves and think they would protest evil. They are horrified by accounts of atrocities, aim to do good in their own lives and will sincerely rattle off the same platitudes that I did in my first three sentences. “Of course I would do something”. Yet I feel this is just an example of the “above average effect”. If you ask someone to rate how good they are at driving, the vast majority of people will rate themselves as “above average”. Statistically improbable indeed! Equally, most people believe that they will stand above the crowd and act on principle, whilst I contend that most people are the crowd.

Of course, people won’t do something bad if told to do so out-of-the-blue but they can be influenced step-by-step in that direction. Consider the famous “Milgram Experiment”. Could anyone be induced, straight out, to administer a potentially lethal 450 volt shock to an unwilling participant for getting a question wrong? Of course not. How about a harmless 15 volt shock to a willing participant in a learning experiment? Yes. Starting from that point, Milgram wanted to see if, by raising the voltage in increments of 15, people could be induced through verbal pressure alone, to give the possibly lethal shock. A staggering 65% gave the full shock; a result confirmed in repeated examples of the test in different times and places. You don’t need to be below average in morality to be capable of unbelievable evil.

What is more scary is that I could see myself being influenced in some way by extremist literature. People will see Mein Kampf for the drivel it is, and will wonder how people could believe such things. Academics inter that, even from a literary point of view, it is dreadfully written. Whilst this is absolutely true, I, for one, found it incredibly compelling [something can be absolute drivel and compelling at the same time- cf. Dan Brown’s Da Vinci Code]. Even I found myself hating Jews after reading it! My critical thinking kicks in quickly and any such thoughts are banished. However, how about in abnormal circumstances where it confirms a prejudice I have, emotional thinking is encouraged, it conforms to what everyone else thinks and I’m going through hard times? Even though I wouldn’t agree with the excesses, would I concede that “he has a point” [much the same reaction people often have on reading Dawkin’s “The G-d Delusion”]? What effect would that have on me?

Perhaps the very fact that I am a reflective person, as evinced by me having these thoughts, would prevent me from falling into this abyss. However, this is fallacious. Some of the most reflective people- scientists, philosophers, religious men- were prominent members of the NAZI party. Most members of the committee who proposed the ‘Final Solution’ were Doctors, and one even insisted on being called Dr. Dr. because of his two PhDs. On the other hand, one of the ‘righteous gentiles’ I learnt about in Yad Vashem was a common thief. How we act in normal times is not a good indicator of our behaviour in the abnormal times.

No doubt, my potential to be evil may seem to myself and others as counter-intuitive. Yet, what is my record like in contemporary times? There is constant and unacceptable de-legitimisation of the State of Israel, but how much do I speak up in defence? On the other hand, an Israeli soldier gloats about her Palestinian prisoners on Facebook, yet how much are these abuses non-apologetically acknowledged in our community? Moreover, what about situations like that in Darfur? I’ve signed a petition and attended a meeting or two. Yet, to be honest, I can’t even really remember anything about it- apart from the word “Janjaweed”. Nor could I say what happened in Rwanda or Bosnia/Serbia. I have read some things about them, but “living your own life” usually cancels out fighting evil. So, what would happen if evil was transferred to my doorstep? I don’t know.

22 Jul 2010

Fact of the Day

There are certain facts that stick in your memory, and a trillion times that amount that do not. Bill Bryson’s A Short History of Nearly Everything is such a well-written book that I will practically forget everything he writes. If a book is too easy to read, then the content will be enjoyable but there is nothing to make it stick in your brain- “as is the effort, so is the reward”. There is definitely one fact that, thanks to Bill, will stay lodged in memory because he provided such a good analogy.

Basically, it’s all about the structure of atoms that had, at one point, thought to be a dense and solid object and shaped like a cube or a currant bun. In fact, an atom is now conceived to be mainly empty space. The neutrons which account for the majority of its mass, as well as the protons, are in a nucleus that constitute a millionth of a billionth of the atom, whilst the electrons spin round the outside. This fact, as stated so far, is one that I was probably taught when I was 15 at school and just like I forgot it then, I’d forget it now. I mean, what the hell does a ‘millionth of a billionth’ mean? However, a good image is all it takes…

Imagine that the atom was the size of a cathedral. If so, the nucleus would only be the size of a fly- but a fly that is many thousands of times heavier than the cathedral.

21 Jul 2010

The Role of a Posek

The Torah Temimah, Rabbi Baruch haLevi Epstein, said the following:

"One does not need to be a great talmid chochom... to give a severe psak.... But it takes unusual talent, abundant wisdom and understanding, and a great spirit for someone to give a psak lekulah.”

Here he is outlining what a key characteristic of a halachic decisor is, according to his father- the author of the Aruch haShulchan. These words are not an unusual thing to hear in and of itself- in fact, I've heard religious people say it a lot as a general principle. However, I usually hear it in the context of forbidding something! "Yes, it is probably halachically permissible but it takes a great rabbi to be lenient- so you can't do it". Often we hear the false modesty that no rabbi in this generation is great enough to do so. In other words, it is used as an excuse not to toil in Torah to make a Jew's life easier, not an imperative to do so!

Nothing could be further from the way of the Aruch haShulchan! He was specifically diverted from producing chiddushim in Torah to being a posek by a talmid of the Vilna Gaon, in order to save Jewish people anguish and monetary loss. Here is the Torah Temimah's recollections of his father:

Words cannot describe the exhaustive, almost painful effort my father expended in order to find some heter for any she'ala that came before him. Unless it was specifically stated in the Talmud or poskim that one must be stringent, he would try to find a lenient psak for even the most serious question. Where a loss of money was involved.. or hospitality to guests was involved, he would increase his efforts tenfold, leaving no stone unturned to find some way to permit the she'ala.

While we are at it, who would give the answer R' Chaim Soloveitchik did as to the role of a rabbi?:

to address the grievances of those who are abandoned and alone, to protect the dignity of the poor, and to save the oppressed from the hands of his oppressor

8 Jun 2010

Blood, Platelets & Begrudging Morality

Now I, as I’m sure a lot of people, do their best to do the right thing.  For some it comes easier than others.  Personally, I’m quite a begrudging sort of guy and it doesn’t ‘warm the cockles of my heart’ to help others.  The overriding emotion once I have ‘discharged my duty’ is probably relief.  Dissonance between what I should do and my natural resistance is a nuisance I am happy to be (temporarily) rid of.

One can understand how, for someone like me, it was the best of both worlds to get a letter from The National Blood Service saying that I couldn’t donate platelets.  Now I do give blood now and again and whilst it causes no great anguish, I am a bit squeamish.  It is not that it hurts but I don’t like the thought of a needle in me, am a bit scared in case I move, and finds the continual hand-pumping action a little uncomfortable.  However, it only takes 10 minutes and the second it is over, I feel no ill effect.  After my compulsory hot chocolate, I am on my way.

Last time I was in to give blood, the nurse asked whether I had considered giving platelets.  Is something I might like to do? Would I like to be tested for?  Of course, this isn’t something that I generally think about at great length.  Equally, it isn’t at the top of my ‘like’ list.  The key point here is that you cannot be a blood donor and a platelet donor at the same time.  As such, I would be (as I found out) swapping a 10 minute donation for 1 and a half hour donation, going in 8 - 10 times a year rather than 4, and have a machine strapped to me and not just a bag!

Not wanting to base my moral decision on what I feel like, I asked for information and also which would be the most useful thing to do.  After a few niceties about how both were incredibly valuable (which they are), I found out that it would probably be better to give platelets if I could.  Fewer people are able to donate them, not many people can commit that amount of time; and unlike blood, they cannot be stored as they only last a short time.  As such, I agreed to take test and if possible, become a platelet donor.

Recently, I got a letter from the National Blood Service with the results.  I was told that: “you have more than enough [platelets] for yourself, however not a sufficient amount extra to provide an adequate donation”.  I’d done the right thing- so to speak- and yet got out of having to take any further action.  Phew!  But is this the right way to feel?  This all depends on whether you subscribe to Aristotle’s view of ethics or Kant’s.

For Aristotle, ‘doing the right thing’ does not make you a moral person or the action a specifically moral one.  It is the role of the politicians to introduce legislation that encourage rational actions promoting the welfare of people and state, and early education to indoctrinate you into performing them.  However, the main role of education is to develop your character such that- like the rest of nature- you always follow the middle path.  You will, for example, develop compassion so that you will want to help people.  An action may be rational but it is only moral if it is a natural expression of a person’s virtuous character.

Kant, on the other hand, disagrees and thinks emotions (or ‘how you feel’ about an action) are not a good guide to morality.  They are transient and will mean different choices on different occasions.  Also, dependant as they are on external circumstances, they are heteronomous and so, not a good guide to character.  Instead, actions must be based on categorical reason, which is the only thing that is truly autonomous.  As such, if someone who doesn’t want to something with every fibre of his being, yet does it because it is rational, it is a truly moral action. This is because it is based on the moral will alone.

It would therefore be very convenient if I Kant was absolutely right, as it would vindicate me.  However, he is not!  I agree that our actions can only be rationally justified.  Equally, I’m very distrustful of those who do what they happen (due to historical accident) to consider the most ‘loving’ thing to do.  Nonetheless, we can only be a truly moral person if we develop our character so that we will naturally follow the dictates of reason.  A begrudging person cannot be truly virtuous!  Oh well.

4 Jun 2010

My Magic-Box, or Phylacteries

After accusing my brother of being responsible for much ‘internecine’ conflict, we got on to discussing whether a word can be part of language if no-one (or nearly no-one) knows what it means.  Clearly, yes.

Whenever someone asks what ‘tefillin’ are, someone always helpfully responds that they are ‘phylacteries’.  Given that neither the person giving the explanation, nor the person receiving it, know what phylacteries mean, it is a bit of a conversation stopper.  The person who originally asked is too embarrassed to question any further.  There is the implicit assumption that as it is a translation, or explanation, they should now have a good idea what it is. 

It is quite clear that ‘phylacteries’ is part of the language- even if (now) only as a synonym for tefillin.  Presumably phylacteries did have some wider meaning in English such that, rather than being a translation, it compared it to a class of things that an English speaker would already be familiar with.  I assumed it would be something like “ritual clothing” or “strapped boxes” or some other category of which tefillin was one member.

Out of curiosity, I looked it up.  The first definition was just a description of tefillin.  The second however, was “amulet” which means: “an ornament often inscribed with a magic incantation or symbol to aid the wearer or protect against evil”.  This is a bastardization of the practice and is, unfortunately, indicative of the superstitions that have entered Jewish consciousness.  No doubt this is what Rav Hirsch complains about when he says:

institutions which were designed and ordained for the internal and external purification and betterment of man as mechanical, dynamical, or magical formulas for the up-building of higher worlds, and . . . thus the observances meant for the education of the spirit to a nobler life were but too frequently degraded into mere amuletic or talismanic performances

Even today Chassidic groups will be put tefillin on people even when there is no kavannah (intention) or meaningful experience of any kind.  It is not done as a mitzvah, or done for the symbolism (e.g. to dedicate emotions and intellect to Hashem), or done as a prayer aid, or pride that you are now Barmitzvah, or as an expression of solidarity with your people.  For me, this is worthless.  Others will thing that sticking cow to your head will influence ‘upper worlds’.

Judaism doesn’t need magic, but then again, there is no need for internecine conflict.

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Afterthought:

If you want spiritual improvement, do the mitzvot.  If you want to be “protected from evil”, stay away from the miracle workers.  You are need of much more sensible advice than wearing tefillin, such as that proffered by the ‘Brisker Rov’, Reb Hayym Soloveitchik (HT: here):

Two women, who came for advice, gave me their story the impression what this interesting man [Brisker Rov] stood for.  One of them had an epileptic child.  She had had a dream in which a miraculous cure was indicated and wished to know the rabbi’s advice.  He remained calm.  “You take him to Warsaw,” he said, “and consult a specialist, as I told you before.” 

The second woman had a more complicated case.  Her husband claimed a commission on a real estate transaction with a Polish noble.  The latter refused to pay, and as R. Hayyim afterwards explained to me, properly.  The claimant was one of the numerous “Luftmenschen” of the Pale, men without any definite occupation, who had heard of an estate that was for sale, talked about it to the count or to one of his employees and after the deal had been closed demanded a compensation.  The count in good old eighteenth century fashion told him, if he should bother him again, he would give him a sound drubbing.  R. Hayyim asked: “what do you want me to do?”  “The Rabbi shall give my husband a blessing so that he shall find grace in the eyes of the Poriz.”  “I can’t give you a blessing,” was the reply.  “The Aibishter alone cane give you a blessing, but I advise you to select a representative person who shall talk to the Poriz, perhaps he may obtain a concession”. 

Or as (possibly apocryphally) told of his grandson Rav J.B. Soloveitchik:

Talmid: Rebbe, can you bless me?

Soloveitchik:  What are you? An apple?

25 May 2010

Rambam and Creation

Below is essay I wrote as part of my undergrad course in philosophy.  It stands up pretty well I think. As usual, I put far too much content in too short a space.  There are few things that now I have studied philosophy of language (which I hadn’t at the time) make me cringe a lot.  But all in all, I think the author is a pretty smart guy! The reason it is reproduced on this blog is two-fold:

1.  As with so many of my essays, I didn’t have a copy of the final version on my computer.  It was finished at university, and my university account will have long ago been destroyed.  It was lucky I found a single final copy on my email.  Having it on blog will help to preserve it.

2.  I started to think about the essay again after reading an article in the student journal of Bernard Revel Graduate School of Jewish Studies: Traditions Against Astrology: An Examination of the Curious Role of Tradition in Maimonidean Epistemology by Daniel LoewensteinIt’s a good article but I think he barks up the wrong tree at times, and that the role of tradition is not as curious as he makes out.  I remembered I had some relevant info about this towards the end of my essay.  I will write about this in my next blog post but wanted my essay online already, so I can reference myself!!!

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Did Maimonides believe in the metaphysical doctrine of creation, or was his defence of this doctrine politically motivated?

Introduction

Maimonides, in his philosophical treatise Guide for the Perplexed[1], defends a creation doctrine that states that G-d willed the universe into existence; in opposition to Aristotle’s thesis that the universe is eternal. However, the Guide is a highly esoteric work with Maimonides claiming that certain metaphysical issues must be partly concealed and as such:

“requires that the discussion proceed on the basis of a certain premise, whereas in another place necessity requires that the discussion proceed on the basis of another premise contradicting the first one”[2]

Therefore, many scholars have argued about whether he really did believe in the metaphysical doctrine of creation[3] or whether he esoterically believed that the universe was eternal[4]. There has been a separate debate in the literature as to the place of the creation doctrine in Maimonides’ political philosophy. The arguments centre on the pedagogical value of the creation doctrine in upholding or directing Jewish law, beliefs and practice. Both the metaphysical and political arguments about creation are studied independently as whether he believed creation to be true is potentially independent of why he emphasised its importance. However, most scholars work on the dichotomy in the title that either he believed creation to be metaphysically true or he emphasised the doctrine for purely political reasons. It is this dichotomy which will be shown to be false throughout this essay.

The basis for the metaphysical-political dichotomy

The difference between doctrines held for metaphysical reasons and those held for political reasons has as its basis a distinction made in Maimonides’ Treatise on Logic[5] between theoretical philosophy and practical philosophy. The former contains geometry, astronomy, the natural sciences and metaphysics whilst the latter includes ethics, economics and politics. According to Maimonides politics is “a science imparting to its masters a knowledge of true happiness, showing them the way to obtain it”[6]. Maimonides taught that the Torah has rendered the ‘nomoi’ of bygone nations superfluous. As such Strauss suggests that “the function of the Torah is emphatically political”[7]. Whilst these ‘nomoi’ deal with the ordering of the city and provisions to obtain what is deemed happiness; the Torah also leads people towards true metaphysical opinions. This is important, as for Maimonides, the ultimate perfection is knowledge of the intelligibles and the demonstrative truths of theoretical philosophy.

“It is clear that to this ultimate perfection there do not belong either actions or moral qualities and that it consists only of opinions toward which speculation has led and that investigation has rendered compulsory”[8].

However, Strauss[9] points out that “the Torah gives only summary indications concerning theoretical subjects, whereas regarding the governance of the city, everything has been dome to make it precise in all its details”. Only a non-political rationality can separate out the true opinions from those that are politically useful. This would suggest firstly that knowledge is reducible to Aristotelian reason and those doctrines in the Torah that are not “true” are merely means to an end. Kreisel[10] denies that this makes political opinions subjective; they are made objective by being the most effective means to an end. However, it is still the case that there is no intrinsic knowledge to be gained from accepting political doctrines.

The dichotomy as evident within the political approach to the creation doctrine

Maimonides’ work can be seen as political in the sense that it reorients Mosaic legislation so that it leads people towards the final end whereby they have knowledge of the necessary truths. An example of this can be shown in Kreisel’s[11] approach to creation whereby it is viewed in terms of its effects in reinforcing the monotheistic idea that “there is a First Existent who gives existence to all existents” and combating idolatry that detracts from this true view. Kreisel points out the discrepancy between the teachings that Maimonides attributes to Abraham between the Mishneh Torah which was written earlier than the Guide. In his Mishneh Torah, Abraham is attributed the proof of G-d’s existence based on the permanence of the spheres, having wondered, “How is it possible for the sphere to be continuously ruled without there being a ruler?”[12] However, Maimonides realised that this approach would lead to the view of the Sabians[13] who all “believed in the eternity of the world, since in their opinion heaven is the deity”[14]. The Sabians reasoned that as the heavens are not subject to coming about or passing away, they must be the dwelling place of G-d and his intermediaries. This served as a justification for their idolatrous practice of worshipping the heavens, which led to the later belief that the spheres were in fact the deity. These considerations can help explain why in the Guide Abraham is attributed with the particularisation argument, which as we will see Maimonides uses to support the doctrine that G-d created the universe. This is because nothing created could be the deity and therefore, is more likely to lead to the true view of G-d. From this example of the political approach we can see that eternity or creation are equally acceptable theories just so long as they lead to the conclusion that G-d is beyond the spheres.

Whilst the above may show the importance of teaching creation to the masses, the Guide is not a rhetorical work directed towards the masses, and therefore cannot explain the arguments in the Guide. Maimonides’ says that it is for a person who “being perfect in his religion and character, and having studies the sciences of the philosophers and come to know what they signify.”[15] Such men live within the bounds of Jewish law and yet are perplexed by apparent contradictions. Their philosophical investigations may lead them to proclaim the truth of the eternity of the universe, which would, according to Maimonides, “destroys the Law in its principle, necessarily gives lie to every miracle, and reduces to inanity all the hopes and threats that the Law has held out”[16]. Such a view would lead people to step outside the bounds of the law and away from ultimate happiness. Strauss notes that “there is a disproportion between the intransigent quest for truth and the requirements of society, or that not all truths are harmless”[17]. In order to retain the benefits of the law whilst retaining one’s philosophical autonomy, people must learn to conceal the rational content of their thought underneath the veil of socially conventional speech. The purpose of the guide, therefore, is to teach the methods of such concealment. After having seen through Maimonides’ esotericism, they must learn to write like that themselves. Just like with Kreisel[18], this allows that a person may proclaim they believe in creation despite actually believing in eternity. “Creation” need only be there to safeguard the law and lead to ultimate happiness.

The thesis of this essay

To the extent that the Torah deals with means to an end, I agree that the Torah is political according to Maimonides’ definition. Also, one cannot ignore the political aspects of the Guide and the creation doctrine, in particular. Maimonides says:

“when there is any division of opinion among the sages which does not affect any rule of practice, but is concerned exclusively with establishing an understanding of a point of doctrine, there is no need to decide in accordance with any one of them”.[19]

Only when a doctrine affects one’s behaviour, such as in the case of the creation doctrine, must an official doctrine be decided upon. Furthermore, this essay will argue that he did not believe creation to be true. However, it will be shown that the dichotomy present in the title is not applicable in the case of Maimonides’ creation doctrine. As such, it will be argued that the creation doctrine is not just political and Maimonides’ did not argue for it merely as a means to an end.

In discussing creation, the most useful distinction Maimonides’ makes is not the one we have already encountered in the Treatise on Logic[20] but one found in his Letter on Astrology where he discusses three different types of knowledge:

“The first is a thing for which there is a clear proof deriving from man’s reasoning […] The second is a thing man perceives through one of his five senses […] The third is a thing that man receives from the prophets or from the righteous”[21]

From this we can see that there other forms of knowledge apart from that which reason can show to be true or false. As such, the creation/eternity issue is not one that can be evaluated in terms of truth and falsity. It will be argued that the creation falls under the third category of opinions received from the righteous where the main form of argumentation is dialectical. Therefore, whilst Maimonides did not believe that creation is literally true, he does not believe that Aristotle’s thesis is either. Instead, ‘creation’ falls under a different category of knowledge.

Metaphysical claims made for creation and eternity in the Guide

My claim would be incorrect if Maimonides did put forward positive claims about creation that are evaluable in terms of their truth and falsity. It seems that this is something he does do as he says, “every existent other than G-d, may He be exalted, was brought into existence by G-d after having been purely and absolutely nonexistent”[22]. Secondly he says that “G-d “was” before He created the world- where the word “was” is indicative of time”[23]. Thirdly, G-d freely willed the universe into being. However, in the course of his discussion all three claims are contradicted and intentionally drained of any force. Many[24] take the first claim to mean that Maimonides is arguing for creation ex nihilo. However, if you consider Maimonides’ language this is not meant as a literal claim as to how the universe was formed. Leaman[25] says that when he uses “min adam” this could either mean G-d created from ‘nothing’ or from ‘matter’; and when being explicit about the creation doctrine he uses ‘la min shay’ (not from something).

In relation to the second claim, he cannot say that there was time before creation given his acceptance of Aristotle’s proposition that time cannot be conceived otherwise than in connection to motion[26]. As Rudavsky says, “time and moving things must be created simultaneously, since neither have any ontological status without the other”[27]. Maimonides readily admits that time belongs to those things created. Therefore, when talking about time before the universe it does not refer to the true reality of time but only something analogous.

Thirdly, what it means for G-d to freely will is left meaningless. Maimonides says that G-d is the intellect, the intellectually cognising object and the intellectually cognised object.[28] They are indistinguishable when the intellect is in action and as G-d “is always an intellect in actu, it follows necessarily that He and the thing apprehended are one thing, which is His essence”[29]. Equally, “that which is never brought into existence is, with reference to His knowledge, an absolutely nonexistent thing”[30]. As such it appears that Maimonides is holding a pantheistic position whereby what exists is part of G-d’s essence and that which does not exist is not possible. As such it does not seem that he is claiming that it is literally true that G-d freely willed the universe into existence.

These contradictions have often led scholars to believe that he agreed with the Aristotelian position that “this being as a whole [the universe], such as it is, has never ceased to be and will never do so”[31]. For example, Rudavsky claims that “an Aristotelian theory of time lends credence to the eternity theory of the universe”[32]. Yet there is much evidence to suggest that this is not the case. Whilst neither motion nor time has ontological status without the other, time “is an accident concomitant with motion, the latter being an accident in that which is moved”[33]. You can only claim that it is necessarily true that the universe has existed eternally if you know it to be necessarily true that motion must exist. As such, “to show the impossibility for the world being having been created in time, not by starting from the nature of being, but by starting from the judgement of the intellect with regard the deity”[34]. Therefore, the battleground between Maimonides and Aristotle is not about ‘time’ but with its corollary; necessity.

Is this not what exactly follow from the arguments in the previous paragraph? Firstly, given Maimonides’ negative theology it would be just as inappropriate to attribute determinism to his essence as it would be to attribute ‘will’. Whilst G-d’s ‘will’ may be used rhetorically to support the law[35], G-d’s determinism is used to show that G-d does nothing that is arbitrary or capricious[36]. Secondly, we can see that he did not think the world was necessary when Maimonides discusses the neo-Aristotelians who hold that G-d willed the universe into existence but did not happen at a particular time[37]. He contends that they abandoned the term “necessary result” but retained the theory of it. Had Maimonides merely wanted to couch the eternity theory in socially acceptable speech he would not have been so vehemently against this. Instead he believes the universe was designed by which “we wish to signify by the term that it- I mean the world- does not necessarily proceed from Him.”[38] Here again we can see there is no literal claim for creation only an argument against necessity.

Maimonides’ arguments for creation

My thesis that neither theory is literally true must be examined within the context of the arguments that Maimonides’ uses for the probability of creation. He uses a two-fold strategy; first, he shows that neither theory is demonstrable and secondly, that there are better reasons for accepting the creation of the world by G-d. The first argument tries to show that you cannot argue from the state of the world as it is now to how it was in production. Maimonides gives the example of a boy who has been brought up by his father on a lonely island and who has never seen a female before[39]. Would this boy be able to believe that a baby could live inside its mother’s tummy without eating through its mouth or breathing their nose? Presumably the boy would not believe this as people die after a very short time being deprived of breath or deprived of food. This reasoning would suggest that babies do not develop in the manner described, but they do! The argument shows that you cannot argue from the state of a fully developed person to how they developed. In the same way we cannot argue from how the world is once created, to how it was in production. Fox[40] explains that inductive arguments are based on analogy; you note that one state of affairs resembles another in a number of ways and conclude that it will also do so in other respects. However, there is no sound analogy that can be drawn to a pre-creation world, as there are no literal claims that we could make about it. As such the current state of the world tells us neither that creation nor eternity are true.

Maimonides then uses his particularity argument[41] to convince us to accept that the world was created. In this argument he wonders why some spheres move from East to West whilst others move in the opposite direction and also why they have different velocities. Also, why is it the case that there is a sphere for each of seven planets but that the upper sphere contains numerous stars? If they are all of a common substance, why are they pre-disposed to assume different forms? He says that these worries are easily alleviated within the theory of creation, as it is a being that wills the direction and velocity of the spheres. He says that Aristotle has tried but failed to give a consistent naturalistic explanation whereby the directions and velocities of the planets follow from the laws of nature. According to him, Aristotle tries to give an explanation in terms of their position in relation to the uppermost sphere. However, in one case a sphere with a higher velocity is above one with a lower velocity; in a second case, the reverse and in a third case, they have equal velocities. It is easy to argue against the specifics of this argument “[b]ecause they are tied to an outdated astronomy, [and as such] the particularity arguments are no longer valid”[42]. Firstly, it is false that the universe is made up of spheres which orbit around the Earth. Secondly, in this era of space travel, we do not face Maimonides’ epistemological difficulties about what space is like. However, according to Goldin, “it is not clear that Maimonides’ argument rests on a confusion between what we cannot know to be the case with what cannot be the case”[43]. Even if everything that happened in the universe was known, we could still ask why it was like that and in virtue of what. Maimonides is saying that, just as there is an explanation for the sublunar sphere, there should be one for the universe as a whole.

The import and effectiveness of Maimonides’ arguments

What is most interesting from our point of view is what import these arguments are supposed to have. What precisely does it mean that neither creation nor eternity are demonstrative? Given that neither are demonstrative, what would further argumentation show about the status of the theories? My argument is that that the fact that neither creation nor eternity are demonstrative theses, indicates to Maimonides that neither are metaphysically true. As such his further arguments are dialectical arguments that tell us which we should accept for reasons, including among others, political ones. However, a more intuitive answer is just that, epistemologically speaking, we cannot know which is true through demonstrative argumentation and that further arguments can tell us which are probably or inductively true. It will be shown that if this second view is taken, Maimonides’ particularity argument has no force.

Maimonides and Aristotle both believe in relation to the spheres that immaterial intellects or unmoved movers are responsible for their movement. As we have seen, Maimonides seems to demand that the spheres and particularly the outermost sphere, which is responsible for the universe as a whole, require an explanation. Does Aristotle believe that there is a similar requirement? In terms of ontology, Aristotle examines what can be said to be and how they relate to each other[44]. Theology, for Aristotle, constitutes determining the role played by immaterial substances and determination that they are intellects. In neither field of study is there room to posit anything responsible for these essences; they are fundamental. For Aristotle, Maimonides’ demand for an explanation is misplaced as they have the features they do, because they have the natures they have. When we see a rabbit we not only say that rabbits are but that there are such things as rabbits. Is this just empty and tautological? Just as the basic kinds that science discovered are posited as first principles, the fact that there are such things as basic kinds is an existence assumption. Therefore, according to Goldwin, “Aristotle himself would have found in Maimonides’ arguments no compelling considerations for admitting temporal creation”[45].

If indeed one theory is true, it has been shown that the particularisation argument has no effect. As there is no reason why it must have an explanation, you would not have to believe that creation is more probably true. However, Maimonides does not deny the fact that these first principles or intelligences must be posited to exist and agrees that they do not compel you to accept creation. The point is that it does not compel you to accept either theory, as neither theory is “true”. As we encountered earlier truth is that to which investigation has rendered compulsory and he also says, “Know that truth refers to the rational virtues of the intellect, since they are the unchanging truths”[46]. Demonstration is not an indicator of truth but is constitutive of it. In other words, something is a truth if and only if it is demonstrative/ necessary. The questions then is “is there a necessary fact that says ‘the universe is eternal’ or ‘the universe was created’?” Maimonides unequivocally answers this by saying that neither theory is demonstrative (given the equivalence between necessity, demonstration and truth). Whilst he believes that the sublunar realm is necessitated by the supra lunar realm, the existence of the supralunar realm is not itself necessary.

Demonstrative and non-demonstrative knowledge within Maimonides’ philosophy of science

The view that a lower realm can be necessary without a higher realm being so can be clarified by looking at his views on astronomy and science. One may call Maimonides a realist about (Aristotelian) science in that everything science declares to exist does really exist. The standard of a true science is that it is demonstrative, not only of the fact that something is as it is but also the reason why. The “why” is to give a cause (in the Aristotelian sense) of why it exists in the way it does. Elements in the sublunar realm conform to this as they exist as in the way they do, due to their position between the encompassing sphere and the centre of the Earth. However, astronomy does not for Maimonides live up to this standard of science. Freudenthal[47] says this is both methodological in that mathematical astronomy does not proceed from facts better known than themselves and substantial, in that it disagrees with Aristotelian science. For example Ptolemy introduced epicycles and eccentrics which conflict with the Aristotelian position that the Earth is at the centre of the universe and the spheres move around it. For example, the eccentric circles do move around a centre but one that is not Earth. However, this does not mean that we should reject astronomy, as among other things their calculations are “not at fault by even a minute”[48]. Instead, Maimonides takes an instrumentalist position where the astronomer’s “purpose is not to tell us in which way the spheres truly are, but to posit an astronomical system […] to correspond to what is apprehended through sight”[49]. As we mentioned in relation to particularity, Maimonides’ argument is to an extent epistemological and Maimonides himself admits there may be an improvement in the science of astronomy. Even so, there would not be causal explanations all the way up and at some point, there will be a mere statement of facts.

Two important points arise from his philosophy of science. Firstly, something is only demonstrative because you can give it a causal explanation and not from the mere fact that it is the way it is. Everything is necessary in relation to the outermost sphere, the Active Intellect, but the outermost sphere itself is left unexplained. Maimonides does not deny that it seems to exist continuously but there is no explanation why it exists continuously. Botwinick says that if you take endlessness seriously:

“one has to envisage the prospect that later entries in the series of statements describing the physical behavio[u]r of the universe will exhibit characteristics and properties that directly contravene those shown by earlier members in the series”[50].

Therefore, that there are a series of facts about the world at the moment does not show that they are necessarily the case. However, if it is not necessarily the case, it need not be eternal! Secondly, the fact that astronomy is not demonstrative is not a reason to reject it and he does not call for it to be reformed. According to Leaman, “[o]n Maimonides’ argument it is a mistake to think of a conflict arising between two competing theories.”[51] Only a demonstrative science can tell you what is necessary and true, but this does not mean other forms of knowledge are not valid. It just means that the knowledge is of a different kind and as such, has a different standard of evidence. For astronomy, the purpose is to make a mathematical system to predict what happens in space and the standard of evidence is whether it matches what is empirically the case. If creation were correct, it would be even more unknowable than astronomy as there is not even a fact in the world that we can empirically verify. However, can this not just be a third competing theory with a different standard of evidence?

Logical and Metaphysical Necessity

As we have seen, Maimonides tries to maintain that the sublunar realm is governed by necessity but the world as a whole is not. However, if we say that G-d ‘freely willed’ the universe into being, is it not possible that G-d could not recreate the universe at each time as in the theory of the Mutakillimun[52]? If this is the case, G-d is the proximal cause of everything and the causal order completely collapses. At this point we need to make a distinction between logical necessity and metaphysical necessity. It is logical necessity, which can either be a priori or a posteriori, that determines what is true. It is the case, a posteriori, that the sublunar realm is logically necessitated given principles known better in themselves, such as the outermost sphere. Maimonides argues against the Mutakillimun as “that which can be imagined is according to them something possible, whether something existent corresponds to it or not”.[53] He argues along Kripkean[54] lines, that whilst it is conceivable that G-d acts as a divine puppeteer, it is not possible. It is this type of necessity which my previous arguments have shown do not apply to the supralunar realm (they are not logically necessitated). However, metaphysical necessity states that the universe is a fundamental fact not in need of explanation. It is absolute necessity which could not have been otherwise. It is this that is possible but which Maimonides argues against with his creation doctrine.

First Principles are never demonstrated

The point that Goldin[55] made that there is no logical reason to compel you to suppose that there needs to be an explanation is correct. However, whilst he saw it as a failure of Maimonides’ particularity argument, it is actually understood and implicit in Maimonides’ assertion that neither theory is demonstrative. There is, as Botwinick says “an underdetermination of theory by fact”[56]. The only way one can avoid an infinite regress of explanation (for any ‘that’ we can always ask another ‘why’) is to embrace circularity and assume the necessity of these first principles. Therefore, according to Maimonides,

Aristotle “thinks [or rather, assumes] furthermore that this whole higher and lower order cannot be corrupted and abolished, that no innovation can take place that is not according to its nature, and that no occurrence that deviates from what is analogous to it can happen in any way”[57]

Given that demonstration is known through principles better known than themselves, the above cannot be a demonstration. Aristotle himself recognises this in his Posterior Analytics[58], where he says that circular demonstration is impossible, as different things cannot be known both prior and posterior to each other. In order that the circularity above is of a less vicious variety, the first principles of any argument must be independent of demonstration. Maimonides employs a similar tactic when he says that the ultimate explanation of the universe is G-d’s will. The literal content of both Aristotle and Maimonides’ theories are the same (i.e. the necessity of the sublunar realm) and is true regardless of whichever metaphysical theory you take to be the case. As such, he cannot suggest that G-d freely willed it unless he already accepts it as a premise. Therefore, both philosophers who assume something in relation to the world as whole can only do so metaphorically. We saw earlier how Maimonides does this in relation to ‘will’, ‘time’ and ‘out of nothing’ but Aristotle does the same with ‘essential nature’.

Dialectical Arguments

The key question then is, which set of premises or first principles should we privilege? Should we assume that the outermost sphere is metaphysically necessary or that it was willed into existence by G-d? As we have seen, this is not a matter of valid reasoning leading to scientific knowledge. Instead, it is of a dialectical, rhetorical or poetical nature which, according to Kraemer, “leads only to consensus, persuasion and evocation”[59]. In Topics[60], Aristotle defines a dialectical problem as an inquiry that can lead either to choice or avoidance or to truth and knowledge. Arsitotle says one would use a dialectical inquiry in regard to issues “to which we have no argument because they are so vast, and we find it difficult to give our reasons, e.g. the question whether the universe is eternal or no”[61]. Equally, a dialectical proposition is a proposition that is accepted by all men, most men or by the most notable of them. One example of a proposition that Aristotle gives that is not demonstrable but that is commonly accepted is that one ought to do good to one’s friends. This fits with Maimonides’ philosophy given the third type of knowledge which we encountered in his Letter on Astrology which was something a “man receives from the prophets or from the righteous.”[62] As such you accepted that ‘the world was created’ as a dialectical proposition deriving from the notable people.

This can help to shed light on what Kreisel[63] said about the political aspects of the creation doctrine. In many ways he is right that the argument used was the one that best to lead people to the demonstrative truth that there is a G-d beyond the spheres and the avoidance of idolatry. However, there are a few points that must be mentioned. Firstly, it is not based on the false assumption that there is the further question “Did he really believe in the eternity theory of the universe?” The whole issue of eternity versus creation is by nature a dialectical argument. Secondly, there is a rational, metaphysical, element in both the accounts given in the Mishneh Torah and Guide that is partly constitutive of the monotheistic idea. Namely, both argue that the spheres are not (logically) necessary hence leading to the speculation that there is a G-d beyond the spheres. This means that not only is there a G-d but the world is not G-d. Thirdly, he is probably right that there is nothing intrinsic to the “creation” doctrine that means we have to accept it over ‘eternity’. Indeed, the fact that you cannot argue from within the world to the world as a whole can be illustrated without creation and is open to all philosophers. However, as we saw at the beginning, this argument does not show its position in the Guide and therefore, does not provide the dialectical argument why we should accept creation. Indeed, it is correct that the Guide allows the ‘perplexed’ to agree with Aristotelian science and yet follow the law. Yet I disagree that someone could believe in eternity as a metaphysical doctrine about the absolute necessity of the universe, whilst professing creation. Instead, creation is a dialectical argument that makes room for both Aristotelian science and the law.

Creation as a dialectical argument showing ‘purpose’ in the world

To see how the dialectical argument proceeds, it is important to note that part of Aristotle’s definition of a cause, and of necessity, is the “final cause”. A material explanation is alone insufficient but must be seen as working for a teleological principle. In On the Heavens Aristotle says, “G-d and nature produce nothing that does not fulfil a purpose.”[64] This is a sentiment that Maimonides shares when he says, “with reference to natural beings, that every one of these has a certain final end, some of them existing for the sake of others”[65]. This necessity or cause is brought about by the spheres, which Aristotle thought were “intelligences”, consciously choosing in accordance with their purpose. The Active Intellect is perfect just thinking about thinking, whilst the other spheres move as they desire to be like it[66]. However, according to Maimonides, “purpose can only be conceived with reference to the production in time of something so produced”[67]. If explanation stops with a fundamental and therefore, inexplicable Active Intellect, we end up with no real explanation at all. Everything is reduced to a mere mechanism deriving from the Active Intellect and as such necessity and chance become indistinguishable. In the language I used earlier, all we can say is that something is the case but not why. As Goodman says, “Causes and effects become mere givens; every event, a pure positivity, with no principle of explanation”[68]. Equally, if the choices of the intelligences derive from absolute necessity they do not even face a modal choice. Nothing is gained by saying they have a choice: they just have to do, what they in fact do, do.

The particularity argument is very much part of this dialectical argument showing that supralunar sphere also has a purpose or final cause. He tries to induce the perspective that the spheres cannot just be explained by trying to approach the outermost sphere or the “perfection”. For if a formulation of their motions could be given in terms of trying to get closer to the Active Intellect, why are some faster than the ones below and on other occasions the opposite? Why do some move to the West and others to East? I will not further explore the argument as Maimonides is involved in dialectic but I am not. It is important to note that whilst Maimonides is giving an argument from design to get us to accept the creation of the universe, he states “I do not deceive myself by designating methods productive of errors as demonstrations”[69]. Instead, unlike the Mutakillimun, he realises that it falls under the auspices of dialectical argumentation. It is therefore better to just accept it as an axiom or first principle. What is it an axiom for?

It allows there to be purpose in the whole universe but one that is not completely knowable through natural science. This opens up the possibility that ‘prophets’ or righteous men could know this purpose. Moreover, it allows a completely naturalistic explanation that Aristotle himself cannot provide. In relation to Moses’ prophecy, he saw all existing things and he “apprehend[ed] their nature and the way they are mutually connected so that he will know how he governs them in general and in detail.”[70] Creation is also an axiom that allows for there to be free will for people to act in accordance with their nature. The spheres do confront real choices but are necessitated because they always act in accordance with their nature. As such, not only is there purpose in nature but also we have real choice to fulfil our purpose or not. This, as we have said, is merely a matter of perspective and does not constitute a theoretical truth. However, according to Leaman:

“the objectivity of the presupposition lies in the relationship between the presupposition and that which it makes possible. As long as we know that the proposition in the presupposition is possible, we are justified in acting upon it”[71]

Conclusion

In this essay, it has been shown that Maimonides did not believe that a metaphysical doctrine of creation was literally true and secondly, it is political in that the doctrine needs to be accepted in order to make the law valid. However, it has been shown that the he did not consider creation as merely a means to an end or that it could be proclaimed whilst believing that the world was eternal. Instead, it is a dialectical argument that is in itself a form of knowledge. Of course, the argument has not actually shown that you should accept creation over eternity. That depends on whether Maimonides’ can successfully explicate how prophets come to know that there is teleology in the world and how this is revealed in the reasons for the commandments. Both of these discussions occur after that of creation in the Guide. However, both the arguments in the Guide and in this essay can be seen as making a space for prophecy. Both in terms of Maimonides’ negative theology and the non-demonstrative nature of the world as a whole “metaphysics recedes on metaphysical grounds to make room for tradition.”[72]


[1] Maimonides (1963 Pines trans). From here on: Guide in the text, GP in the footnotes.

[2] GP, Introduction, p.18

[3] for example, Seeskin (2005)

[4] for example, Rudavsky (2000)

[5] Efros (trans. 1938)

[6] ibid. p.64

[7] Strauss (1973). P.159

[8] GP III:27 p.511

[9] Strauss (1973) p. 157

[10] Kreisel (1999)

[11] Kreisel (1999)

[12] Mishneh Torah, Laws of Idolatory I:3 as cited in Kreisel (1999), p.42

[13] Maimonides found a book Nabatean Culture which outlined the practices of the Sabians which was the religion of Babylonia which Abraham rebelled against. Maimonides uses them to represent paganism in general. See Pines (1963) p .cxxiii

[14] GP III:29 p. 515

[15] GP Introduction p.5

[16] GP II:25 p.328

[17] Strauss (1963) p. 26

[18] Kreisel (1999)

[19] Sanhedrin 10:3 as cited in Fox (1990), p.45

[20] Efros (1938)

[21] Lerner (1963) as cited in Freudenthal (2005), p.136

[22] GP II:13 p. 281

[23] ibid

[24] Seeskin (2005)

[25] Leaman (1990)

[26] GP. Introduction to II. Proposition 15.

[27] Rudavsky (2000) p.36

[28] GP I:68

[29] GP I:68 p.165

[30] III:20 p. 481

[31]GP II:13 p.284

[32] Rudavsky (2000) p.38

[33] GP II:13 p. 282

[34] GP II:17 p. 298

[35] Botwinick (1997)

[36] Fox (1990)

[37] GP II:21

[38] GP II:21 p.315

[39]GP II:17

[40] Fox (1990)

[41] GP II:19

[42] Seeskin (2000), p.83

[43] Goldin (1992) p.197

[44] information in this paragraph from Goldin (1992)

[45] ibid, p. 202

[46] Eight Chapters: 4 as cited in Kreisel (1999) p. 103

[47] Freudenthal (2003)

[48] GP II:24 p.326

[49] ibid

[50] Botwinick (1997), p.92

[51] Leaman (1990), p. 74

[52] Philosophers such as Al-Ghazali who wrote the book “Incoherence of the Philosophers” in order to refute philosophy and defend religion. See Pines (1963) page cxxiv

[53] GP I:73 p.207

[54] Kripke (1981)

[55] Goldin (1992)

[56] Botwinick (1997), p.90

[57]GP II:13 p.284

[58] Aristotle, Posterior Analytics (1941 trans, 2001 ed.), I:3

[59] Kraemer (2000), p.117

[60] Aristotle, Topics, (1941 trans, 2001 ed.)

[61] ibid. I:11 p.197

[62] Lerner (1963) as cited in Freudenthal (2005), p.136

[63] Kreisel (1999)

[64] as cited in Altmann (2000), p.6

[65]GP III:13 p.449

[66] Aristotle, Metaphysics. (1941 trans, 2001 ed.), XII:9

[67] ibid

[68] Goodman (2000), p.70

[69]GP II:16 p.293

[70] GP I:54 p.124

[71] Leaman (1990), p.81

[72] Botwinick (1997) p.44